Abstract-Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. In this paper, we develop a novel strategic resource availability management (STREAM) system to improve information integrity and availability in an energy constrained CPS environment under the presence of malicious adversaries. The term "resource" here can be any component of a CPS. The main elements of STREAM are: 1) difficult but realistic "repeated (adversary-defender) game" settings and 2) a set of provably optimal defender strategies plus effective heuristics, against equally potent adversary moves. STREAM is based on the concept of dynamic games in sequential game theory, and is the first system to incorporate the realistic behavioral aspect that in many CPSs, both, the class of adversaries, as well as the class of CPS protectors, could move in a covert and stealthy manner in order to outwit the other in the war on "resource control." In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of STREAM strategies to improve CPS resource availability to the nonadversary, we first conduct a thorough theoretical analysis on a model smart grid CPS as a representative example of a CPS. We then follow up the analysis with an extensive simulation study on the standard IEEE 14 smart power grid architecture. The results show that STREAM strategies improve smart grid system integrity and availability by approximately upto 67% when compared to nonstrategic approaches. Our proposed (analysis, simulation) suite for the grid is extendible to general CPS application domains.
crucial role of CPSs in everyday life, cyber-physical security needs to be promptly addressed.
In view of the above, resource availability and information integrity are one of the most important objectives in the security of CPSs [1] . Here, the term "resource" implies any component in the CPS that is integral to its proper functioning. A loss in resource availability leads to the disruption of access to or use of information, thereby hampering system functionality. Examples of typical availability attacks include DDoS attacks on all layers of a CPS network architecture [channel jamming (a physical layer attack), MAC layer spoofing, buffer flooding (a TCP/IP layer attack), and application layer attacks)]. Preserving information integrity refers to a system's ability to guard against improper information modification or destruction by adversaries in order to enforce information nonrepudiation and authenticity. A loss of information integrity will induce incorrect decision making, thereby transferring control to system adversaries to cause damage. Integrity attacks are in general more sophisticated than availability attacks and mainly occur at the application level. Examples of information integrity attacks include stealthy data modification, and false data injection attacks. The focus of this paper is to address the proper management of executing countermeasuring solutions to adversary-driven resource availability and integrity attacks in CPSs. As a representative example of a CPS to base our work upon, we choose the smart grid.
A. Availability and Integrity Issues in the Smart Grid
Before motivating our research problem, we educate the general reader with a brief example of resource availability and integrity attacks on the various primary layers of a smart grid architecture [1] , their impacts on the grid, and mention existing technical countermeasures to mitigate such attacks. We motivate our problem in the following section emphasizing the strategic importance of managing the time instants when countermeasures need to be executed.
1) Availability Issues:
A feature not that common to the general Internet but characteristic to many CPSs including the smart grid is the necessity to serve delay constrained applications. As an example, in the power substation network of a smart grid there is a stringent need of information or control messages to be delivered to the power systems (e.g., IEC 61 850 messages [2] for local management) in time. Thus, a denial-of-service (DoS) attacker need not completely shut down network access. It just needs to launch weaker versions of availability attacks to intentionally delay the transmission of a time-critical message to violate its timing requirement. Availability attacks in the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network consists of the SCADA center becoming a primary target to distributed DoS 0278-0070 c 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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attacks than can be launched from various local area systems, thereby leading to untimely (but not necessarily time critical) monitoring and control. In regard to time critical SCADA network attacks, weak DoS attacks on individual local area networks [3] , [4] can delay or block correlated data delivery from these networks to the SCADA center or the phasor data concentrator [5] , thereby affecting the state estimation and synchronization process that has a delay requirement of tens of milliseconds. At the home-area network level of a smart grid, availability attacks include the execution of conventional DoS attacks (as the ones on the Internet or in sensor networks [6] ), that focus on things like jamming real-time price signals between the utility and the consumer advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) network [7] , resulting in the dysfunction of price-driven demand response mechanisms.
2) Integrity Issues: At the power substation network level, spoofing and false data injection attacks can lead to a loss of integrity. For example, switches are used to protect power infrastructures in substations. When an intelligent electronic device (IED) detects an abnormal status (e.g., high current), it will send open/close messages to switches to balance load (or break the circuit for protection) [8] . If a spoofing attacker successfully masquerades itself as a monitoring IED, it could send false close/open messages to switches, and lead the protection system to mess-up system status, potentially resulting loss of power supply for customers. At the SCADA network level, man-in-the-middle attacks inject falsified data during communication. In addition, attackers can cooperate with each other in order to successfully launch data integrity attacks on the SCADA center if individual tampering is easily identifiable [3] , [4] . At the home-area-network level, integrity attacks include conventional man-in-the-middle and data falsification attacks on the AMI network [9] .
3) Technical Countermeasures: Common existing solutions to counter these attacks primarily comprise of techniques falling into two major categories: 1) network solutions and 2) cryptographic solutions [1] . The class of network solutions are primarily designed to prevent DoS attacks, and include signal and packet-based attack detection, spoof detection modules, rate-limiting mechanisms, filtering suspicious flows, and anti-jamming solutions. The class of cryptographic solutions are mainly designed to counter integrity attacks, and include encryption, authentication, and key management. A detailed overview of state of the art technical countermeasures to availability and integrity attacks in the smart grid is given in [1] and [10] - [14] .
B. Research Motivation
Despite the existence of effective technical countermeasures to improve availability and integrity in the smart grid, one necessarily important aspect that has remained unaddressed in its security literature is the right timing behind executing the countermeasures, more importantly in adversarial settings.
With respect to improving security in the grid, we firmly believe in the slogan: "Designing Technical Countermeasures for the smart grid is Necessary but Not Sufficient!" The strength of our belief lies in the fact that most CPSs (e.g., the smart grid) can be viewed as a networked information processing system, comprising as integral components, low capacity (both in terms of energy and processor/memory capacity) sensors that play a vital role in many computations geared toward optimal decision and control. In such an energy constrained information processing environment, it is imperative to execute energy consuming technical countermeasures (e.g., the spoof detector module as explained above) in a "timely" fashion to conserve the former. However, a strategic adversary would deliberately aim to attack in a manner that does not conflict with the timing sequence of the CPS protector(s), so that: 1) it can have control of the system as much as possible and 2) push the protector(s) to drain more of their energy behind increasing the frequency of countermeasuring activities, eventually leading to inevitable availability attacks after eventual protector drain outs.
Thus, an important goal in the smart grid is to come up with a strategic resource availability management (STREAM) scheme that minimizes the amount of time that a strategic adversary(s) can have control of the system. The sole focus of this paper is to design one such scheme. The scheme will leverage the availability and integrity performance of the grid through existing countermeasures, via their proper "execution timing" management. In this paper, we use the term resource to imply any component of a CPS that adversaries might target. Achieving our goal would ensure that the "good guys" will considerably have more control on the smart grid than the "bad guys" over time, and in the process also save energy resources.
C. Related Work on Using Game Theory in the Smart Grid
Game theory provides the basis for generalizing strategic decision making and distributed optimization in a multiagent setting. Despite the development of a large number of countermeasures for the smart grid [1] , the specific use of game theory for strengthening security in the smart grid is relatively scarce. Chen et al. [15] used two-player zero-sum static games between a so-called intentional attacker and a fusion-based defender to compute the equilibrium network robustness corresponding to minimax strategies. Law et al. [16] , [17] used two-player zero-sum stochastic games for assessing security risks and optimal defenses for the smart grid. In comparison, in a current work Law et al. [18] presented a nonzero-sum game-theoretic approach to smart grid security by combining quantitative risk management techniques with decision making on protective measures. Specifically, as pregame steps, they: 1) provide a more intuitive definition of risk states; 2) study concrete clustering-based intrusion detection algorithms instead of hypothetical ones; and 3) provide alternative definitions of the players payoffs, one of which is based on the financial risk measure of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). Calculated risks based on the CVaR measure are then incorporated into a stochastic security game model as input parameters. The decisions on defensive measures are obtained by solving the game using dynamic programming techniques which take into account resource constraints. Thus, the formulated security game provides an analytical framework for choosing the best response strategies against attackers and minimizing potential risks. The difference of our work with the above mentioned ones is the use of game theory to decide on the right timing behind executing effective countermeasures, instead of the use of game theory to design effective countermeasures. In this regard, game-theoretic methods have been extensively applied in the risk analysis of general critical cyber-physical infrastructures by explicitly accounting for the interactions between providers and attackers [19] .
Both the formulation and solution space of such works is quite extensive, including multiple-period games [20] that address multiple timescales of system dynamics; incomplete information games [21] - [23] that account for partial knowledge about the system dynamics and attack models; and multiple-target games [24] , [25] that account for possibly competing objectives. However, unlike us, none of the above efforts address issues of covert attacks.
D. Research Contributions
In this paper, we design a novel STREAM fabric for CPSs, under adversarial settings. The main elements of STREAM are: 1) difficult but realistic "dynamic adversary-defender game" settings and 2) a set of provably optimal defender strategies plus effective heuristics, against equally potent adversary moves. Through STREAM, we make the following research contributions.
1) As a basic component of STREAM, we model a timing game played between a single attacker (the adversary) and a defender (e.g., the SCADA center in the smart grid) to represent the "war" for resource control over a period of time in a CPS, i.e., in this paper, the smart grid. The design of our timing game is based on the concept of dynamic games in sequential game theory. The novelty of our proposed game lies in the fact that unlike traditional game-theoretic (be it static or dynamic) approaches, where game players assume immediate move knowledge after their opponent makes a move (irrespective of when they move), STREAM relaxes this assumption to capture scenarios where game players might not have immediate move knowledge about their opponent. This relaxation is aligned with reality where an adversary would want to launch covert attacks on the smart grid that go undetected, also the defender would want to fix the system without the knowledge of the adversary (see Section II). 2) We study the Nash equilibria (NE) and dominant STREAM strategies (see Section II for definitions.) of our proposed (single attacker, single defender) game, and investigate in theory, the following parameters with respect to player move costs: a) optimal strategy parameters (see Section II for definition) for the attacker and the defender and b) optimal utilities (see Section II for definition) for the attacker and the defender. For energy constrained environments such as ours, the results provide practical insights for smart grid administrators to appropriately sketch out as strategy, the time instants when technical countermeasures need to be executed in order to: a) protect the smart grid from being frequently compromised by an adversary and b) de-incentivize the adversary from attacking the grid (see Section III). 3) For reliability and fault tolerant purposes, STREAM game settings investigate the case of multiple defenders in the smart grid fighting an adversary, or a single class of multiple synchronous adversaries. The rationale behind modeling multiple defenders is to reflect the practical scenario where adversaries target multiple strategic points in the grid to ensure the success of availability and integrity attacks. The goal of the defenders is to prevent the adversaries from having attack success on a threshold number of strategic points, below which the grid is uncompromised. In this regard, we extend the (single attacker, single defender) model to include multiple defenders and conduct a performance analysis on the extended model. We show through theory that from a defender viewpoint, it is optimal to execute technical countermeasures, i.e., move strategies in STREAM, time independently (instead of synchronously) amongst different defender units when an attacker needs to compromise (n/2) + 1 grid units in order to compromise the system (see Section IV). 4) We validate the theory behind STREAM's effectiveness using extensive simulations conducted on the standard IEEE 14 power grid architecture. As our main simulation results, we show that: a) STREAM improves grid availability and integrity by up to 67%, under adversarial settings, compared to existing strategic and nonstrategic methods not in the STREAM set; b) STREAM reduces average overall energy expenditure via its countermeasures by atleast around 90%; c) increasing the number of defenders in STREAM game setting reduces the effectiveness of the attacker in approximately an exponential fashion, compared to their decrease in a nearly linear fashion for nonstrategic timing scenarios; and d) the attacker effectiveness under STREAM decreases upto approximately 80%, compared to when defenders adopt nonstrategic moves (see Section V).
II. STREAM-GAME SETUP In this section we first qualitatively describe the structural outline of the dynamic game setting in STREAM between smart grid adversaries and their defenders that is based on the game concept in [26] . The outline captures a realistic example of an attack scenario in the smart grid that motivates our game formulation. We then follow it up with the mathematical formulation of the game. The outline is highlighted for a single defender and attacker. However, the game outline extends to multiattacker, multidefender scenarios, as will be analyzed in Section IV. Table I lists the important symbols used in the formal definition of the game (and in this paper). We will use the term "attacker" and "adversary" interchangeably throughout the rest of this paper. A brief discussion on similarities and differences of our game approach when compared to traditionally used models of dynamic games in provided in Section VI.
A. Game Outline
Consider a smart grid resource (e.g., MAC layer parameters) that can be controlled by either of two players (attacker or defender). As a representative example for this paper, the adversary or attacker could be a spoofer that tries to take advantage of the openness of the address fields in an MAC frame to masquerade itself as another device to send fake information to other devices. Spoofing attacks can lead to loss of both availability and integrity. In a power substation network, a malicious node can broadcast forged address resolution protocol packets to shut down connections of all IEDs to the substation gateway node [27] . One of the functions of an IED is to detect an abnormal status, e.g., high current, when it will send close/open messages to switches to balance the power load (or simply break the circuit for protection). If a spoofing attacker successfully masquerades itself as a monitoring IED, it could send false close/open messages to switches and lead the protection system to a mess-up status, resulting in potential loss of power supply for customers. A spoof detector running on the microcontroller of a sensor module can act as a defender in this example. Once the spoof detector is successful in detecting a spoof, it informs the substation network administrator and the latter takes steps to undo the actions implicated by a corresponding spoof message. When the adversary is successful in its actions, we say that the smart grid is compromised.
1) Concept Behind Spoof Detector:
The use of received signal strength (RSS) to distinguish wireless devices for spoof detection is a well known tool in wireless networking. RSS is the signal strength of a received frame measured at the receivers antenna. Many commercial 802.11 chipsets provide per frame RSS measurements. RSS is correlated to the transmission power, the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, and the radio environment because of multipath and absorption effects. Typically, a wireless device, e.g., a sensor in a smart meter, does not often change its transmission power, so a drastic change in RSS measurements of received frames from the same MAC address suggests a possible spoofing attack. The farther the attacker is from its victim, the more likely their RSS patterns differ significantly, and the easier it is to detect (using a spoof detection module programmed in the smart meter sensor) the spoofing attacks. With a dense array of air-monitors (AMs) (off-the-shelf 802.11 devices used to passively sniff wireless traffic), without cooperation from access points (APs) or client stations, even if an attacker can somehow manipulate its transmission power to mimic the RSS pattern of the victim to one AM, it is inherently difficult to fool the majority of these AMs, each of which have a different radio environment.
However, due to energy constraints, the spoofing detector can only run at particular time instants. As a result, there could be intervals of time when the adversary will have control of a smart grid resource before the spoofing detector is back in action again. Our goal in this paper is to minimize the cumulative duration of such time intervals over time. Ownership of a resource will change back and forth following a move of either player, with the goal of each player being to maximize the fraction of time that he or she controls the resource. This change of ownership concept is common in strategic security settings, where both the defender and the attacker fight back repeatedly over time to gain control over the other (see Fig. 1 ). 1 An attacker move occurs when the adversary tries to gain control of a smart grid resource, whereas a defender move occurs when the spoof detector is run to test for a potential spoof attack.
We assume in the realistic case that the players might not know when its opponent has taken over control of a smart grid resource. Nor might they know: 1) the current ownership of the resource unless they perform a move and 2) the number of times the opponent moves before they take control of the resource [see more on the rationales behind 1) and 2) in Section III]. Also important is the fact that to move, a player must pay a move cost; players thus have a disincentive against moving too frequently. In our setting, the move costs for the defender are expenditures in battery energy units to run the spoof detector in the microcontroller, whereas move costs for the attacker are its effort costs. Clearly, it is too costly for both the attacker and the defender to always monitor the grid resource continuously and have control over it.
B. Formal Game Definition
As mentioned previously, we have two players in our proposed monitoring game: the "good" player identified with a 0 (the defender or the spoof detector), and the "bad" player (a malicious entity trying to compromise a smart grid resource), identified with a 1. The game begins at time t = 0 and continues indefinitely as t approaches infinity. However, there are practical scenarios where the game ends the first time the attacker is tracked down. Our model captures this situation as a special case. In this paper, we treat time as a continuous variable, though our model is capable enough to handle discrete versions of time. We propose a time-dependent variable CP(t) that denotes the current player controlling the resource at time t. CP(t) is either 0 or 1 at any time t. We say the game is in good state if CP(t) = 0 and in bad state if CP(t) = 1. We also let CP i (t) = I(CP(t) = i) denote whether the game is in a good state for player i. Here I(·) is an indicator function which takes in a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Therefore, CP 1 (t) = CP(t) and CP 0 (t) = 1−CP 1 (t). We assume that the game begins in the good state with CP(0) = 0.
A player may make a "move" (execute its control command) at any time but only does so a finite number of times in a given time period. It can only move once at a given time. The two players can move at the same time with the moves canceling each other and resulting in no change of state. We denote the sequence of move times, for moves of both players, as an infinite nondecreasing sequence given as follows: t = t 1 , t 2 , . . . Let p k denote the player who made the kth move, so that p k {0, 1}. We assume that t 1 = 0 and p 1 = 0. For each player i = 0, 1, we let t i = t i,1 , t i,2 , . . . be the infinite increasing sequence of times when player i moves. Each element of the sequence can be thought of as a strategy adopted by player i to generate a move at the corresponding time-stamp. In this paper, we assume that a player can generate its time sequence in advance (without the opponent knowing of it), before the game play starts in either a deterministic or randomized manner. Note that the sequences t 0 and t 1 are disjoint subsequences of t. The game's state variable, CP(t), denotes the player who has moved most recently (not including the current instant t), so that the following holds:
has moved recently and is in control of the game or has possession of the resource under consideration. We denote m i (t) to be the number of moves made by player i up to and including time t, and let m(t) = m 0 (t) + m 1 (t) denote the total number of moves made by both players up to and including time t. For t > 0 and i = 0, 1, we let r i (t) = ((m i (t))/t) denote the average move rate by player i up to time t. We assume that a player needs to make a move to know whether its opponent has control of a resource. It does not get any/immediate feedback from the grid regarding the opponent's takeover instant, or the amount of time the latter has control of the system.
A player receives a benefit (utility) equal to the number of time units for which they are the most recent mover, minus the cost of making the moves. We denote the cost of a move for player i by k i . The total gain by player i is denoted as G i as is given by
We denote the average gain rate for each player as γ i (t) = ((G i (t))/t), where γ i (t) is the fraction of time that player i has control of the grid resource up to time t. Thus, for all t > 0, γ 0 (t) + γ 1 (t) = 1. We let NB i (t) denote player i's net benefit up to time t. This net benefit is the gain (total possession time) minus the cost of player i's moves so far. We express NB i (t)
t). The average benefit of player i is denoted as b i (t) and is given as
, which equals the fraction of time the resource has been owned by player i, minus the cost rate for moving. For any given game, we define player i's asymptotic benefit rate (or just benefit) as b i = lim inf t→∞ b i (t).
A NE [28] for a game G(C 0 , C 1 ) is a pair of player strategies
Here C i is the class of strategies for player i. Intuitively, the NE represents the situation when no player has any incentive to deviate from its strategy. A strategy S 0 is strongly dominant [28] for player 0 in game
A strategy S 0 is weakly dominant [28] for player 0 in game
Similar definitions of dominant strategies hold for player 1 since our game is symmetric [28] . Note that the intersection of dominant strategies of both players always imply an NE but not vice-versa. 
III. GAME ANALYSIS [SINGLE (ATTACKER, DEFENDER) SCENARIO]
In this section we analyze our proposed single attacker, single defender game. Note again that as a representative example, the attacker could be a spoofer trying to manipulate the MAC parameters (the resource) of a local substation network, and the defender is a spoof detector running on a sensor module's microcontroller. We assume that each player's intermove durations are generated by a fixed probability distribution via a stochastic process. For the purpose of this paper, we use a renewal process [29] to model intermove durations of players. A renewal process is a generalization of the Poisson process, except that the holding times take on a more general distribution, instead of a Poisson distribution. Note, however, that the independence and identical distribution property of the holding times is retained. In regard to a player employing a renewal strategy, the intervals between its consecutive moves are independent and identically distributed random variables generated by a renewal process. The interval until the next move only depends on the current move time and not on previous history. The game is graphically depicted in Fig. 2 with general distributions f 0 and f 1 for the defender and the attacker, respectively.
A. Defender Strategy
In this paper, we assume that the defender plays with a memoryless exponential distribution (a special type of renewal process characterized by a probability distribution that describes the time between events in a Poisson process) with rate λ, i.e., r 0 = λ. Let us call this strategy E λ (In Fig. 2 , X j s are exponentially distributed). The rationale for a defender adopting an exponential strategy (an STREAM strategy) is that even if the attacker is able to track the timing of the defender's moves, he has no advantage over the defender in predicting his next move (due to the memoryless nature of the exponential distribution). In practice, attackers are quite prompt and smart and do have tools and resources available to them to track defender moves at times.
B. Attacker Strategy
We assume in this paper that an adversary is capable in the best case to observe the last time when the defender played its move. We make this assumption to reflect reality where an attacker is generally more powerful than the defender. In light of the results mentioned in [26] regarding optimal strategies by an attacker (given that he is allowed to play strategies that are either renewal or periodic), we go by the fact that it is optimal for the attacker to move at periodic intervals of time, where the starting move time of the attacker is unknown to the defender. However, in the case when the defender is able to log and track attacker move information, it is optimal for the attacker to also play exponential strategies, i.e., move timings governed by an exponential distribution. We model this optimal exponential attacker strategy in Section IV.
We now study the NE, and the dominant strategies for the players in the game. Through Theorems 1-3 adapted from results in [26] , we derive closed form expressions for optimal values of game parameters. Since the three theorems are closely related together, and given the nature of the closed form expressions they entail, we feel it appropriate to provide their implications together after the results obtained from the simulated version of the game implementation. We have the following result regarding the dominant strategy of an attacker when the defender plays exponentially with rate λ.
Theorem 1 [26] : The strongly dominant strategy for an attacker when the defender plays with exponentially with rate λ is either P r for some average play rate r > 0, or no play. The player benefit tuple when the attacker's strongly dominant strategy is P r , is given by
The player benefit tuple when the attacker's strongly dominant strategy is "no play" is
Here, δ is the optimal period of move of the attacker and r = (1/δ). The intersection of the strongly dominant strategies of the players is the NE of the game. The next theorem decides on the optimal value of δ (the attacker's move period), given a fixed value of λ.
Theorem 2 [26] : Given that the defender plays with an exponential distribution E λ with fixed rate λ, the strongly dominant strategy, P r of the attacker is given by the solution to the equation
, the strongly dominant strategy of the attacker is not playing at all. A rate of λ chosen by the defender induces a period of δ for the attacker that the defender can compute in advance. In a pregame strategy selection, a defender committed to play an exponential strategy can determine the rate of play λ that maximizes his benefits assuming that the attacker also chooses an optimal strategy. The following theorem provides a close form expression for the λ that maximizes the defender's benefit.
Theorem 3 [26] : When the defender plays exponentially, and the attacker chooses an optimal move period δ as given by Theorem 2, the optimal λ for the defender is given by
where z is the unique solution to the equation
In the case when k 0 < 0.854 · k 1 , the maximum defender's benefit is obtained by playing at rate λ = (1/k 1 ) .
Substituting the optimal (λ, δ) values in the player benefit expressions of Theorem 1, we have
IV. GAME ANALYSIS [MULTIPLE (ATTACKER-DEFENDER) SCENARIO]
In this section, we extend the STREAM game setting in Section II (and its analysis in Section III) to account for multiple defenders protecting a smart grid. We provision for the case when there are multiple strategic points of attack in the grid, and in order to successfully compromise the latter, an attacker needs to compromise at least half of the defenders (a concept in line with the consensus argument proposed in [30] ). A typical example of such a setting occurs at the SCADA network level. Features from correlated data samples from local-area systems are collected to have a global snapshot of power signal quality at a particular time instant. The correlation between sampled raw data from different locations, in fact increases the difficulty for attackers to falsify power status information to the SCADA center. Independent tamper of data samples can easily be identified by the data-integrity detector at the SCADA center [4] . Thus, attackers may cooperate with one another in order to successfully launch attacks by compromising a certain threshold of sensors. Once a coordinated attack is successfully launched, it can bypass conventional bad-data detectors and steathily result in devastating impacts on power system operations. We divide this section in two parts. In the first part, we propose the modeling extensions to the single attacker, single defender model. We then follow it up with the game analysis.
A. Modeling Extensions
We consider a defender class and an attacker class consisting of potentially multiple players in each class. We first state the attacker/defender goals and then propose the player strategy types.
1) Attacker and Defender Goals:
For the purpose of modeling simplicity, we will assume here that it is enough for the attacker class to compromise (n/2) + 1 defenders, where n is the total number of strategic attack points, and is an odd number. We also assume knowledge by the attacker class of which (n/2) + 1 attack points are most important to its cause. Similarly, the defender class also realizes that the subset of (n/2) + 1 points chosen by the attacker class is most important to its cause. Our assumption on such type of selection subsets makes sense in general because the defender class would likely associate weights to the importance of various attack points under its control. The case analysis of an attacker class being allowed to comprise any subset (n/2) + 1 attack points or more, is more general and mathematically involved. We leave the analysis of this case to future work.
2) Player Strategy Types: We assume that the defenders play renewal strategies. As a special case of renewal strategies, they also play exponential or Poisson strategies (an STREAM strategy). These strategies are of key importance, because they are the only memoryless continuous probability distributions. The memoryless property means that the conditional probability that we have to wait more than t 1 time before the next move, given that the time elapsed since the last move is t 2 , is independent of t 2 . This implies that if the defender class uses an exponential strategy, an attacker with history of the defender's previous moves cannot learn any information regarding the timing of the defender's next move. Consequently, the exponential strategy might be a good choice for a defender facing an attacker who tries to track the history of defender moves. In case of the attacker, we assume that in additional to renewal strategies, he also plays periodic strategies. This is because for the single attacker, single defender scenario, periodic strategies by the attacker are shown to be optimal in response to renewal strategies by the defender (see Section III).
Regarding the nature of timing moves made by the adversary class, and the defender class, we assume two different methods: 1) both the adversary class and the defenders move independently and asynchronously across the attack points [move method 1 or MM1 (not to be confused with "M/M/1" from the theory of queues)] and 2) both the adversary class and the defenders move synchronously across the attack points, though at different times (move method 2 or MM2). For both the defender as well as the adversary class, it could also be the case that either class could consist of just one member, a single attacker and/or a single defender, and is able to launch moves on multiple attack points simultaneously. In case of MM1, the asymptotic benefit (or simply the benefit) for each player is given by
where N = (n/2) + 1, k j i is the move cost of player i on the jth attack point, i {0, 1}, r j i is the move rate of player i on attack point j, and − → r i is the vector of move rates for player i on the N given attack points. Similarly, in the case of MM2, the benefit for each player is given by
where r i is the single move rate for all the defenders in a synchronized setting. We note here that by player 0, we imply the defender class instead of a single defender.
B. Analysis (Multiple Defenders)
In this section, we analyze the different games that can be played between an attacker and a defender class. We classify our results based on the type of strategies played by the defender class, and the attacker class. We focus on providing mathematical expressions for the benefit of the attacker class and studying how it varies with the number of members in the defender class. The asymptotic average gain (or just gain) of the defender class, γ 0 , is simply 1 − γ 1 and as a result the benefit of this class can be computed from the relation,
. Thus, we do not provide the expressions for b 0 in our results.
We also note that the study of (attacker, defender) benefits with respect to move costs and move rates has already been conducted in Section IV. The results in this section are mainly about the effect of the number of defenders on adversary benefits. The results in this section are presented in the form of the following three theorems, the proofs of which are in the Appendix.
Theorem 4: When both the attacker and the defender class play strategies in the general class (R ∪ P), the attacker benefits for different move method scenarios are given by the following.
Case 1: Both the attacker and the defender class adopt MM1
Case 2: The attacker class adopts MM2 and the defender class adopts MM1
Case 3: Both the attacker and the defender class adopt MM2
Case 4:
The attacker class adopts MM1 and the defender class adopts MM2
Here, (R ∪ P) denotes the set of strategies in the union of the set of periodic and renewal strategies,
is the random variable representing the time elapsed since player i's last move on attack point j if i adopts MM1 (adopts MM2). The corresponding density and cumulative distribution functions for these random variables are f Z
Theorem Implications: We infer from the theorem result that MM1, i.e., moving independently is generally better than MM2, i.e., moving synchronously at once, for the defender class, as class move rates are additive. This can be explained in view of the fact that the defender class only needs to control at least one attack point, and so it is optimal for the class to move (have control of) one attack point at a time. This behavior from the defender side forces the attacker class to move on all N = (n/2) + 1 attack points as it does not have information about which attack points are in control of the defender class. We also infer that the adversary class should adopt MM2 over MM1 because with increasing N, its benefit decreases at a faster rate using MM1 than using MM2 (assuming that the move rate of both players remain the same). However, be it MM1 or MM2, in order to compromise the smart grid, the message spoofer spends significantly more resources with increasing number defenders. This is good news from the security enhancement viewpoint as spending more resources would eventually de-incentivize the malicious adversary from targeting the system.
Corollary 1: When both the attacker and the defender class play strategies in the exponential class, the attacker benefits for different move method scenarios are given by the following. Corollary Implications: Similar to the implications of Theorem 4, we infer that MM2 strongly dominates (outperforms) MM1 for an attacker, and for the same reason provided for Theorem 4. However, an attacker loses the freedom of choosing the move rate for each attack point independently. Thus, when the heterogeneity of the attacker's move costs is very high, it adopting MM1, may outperform its benefit from adopting MM2. On the other hand MM1 strongly dominates MM2 for the defender class, even for very heterogeneous move costs.
Corollary 2: When the attacker class plays strategies in the P class and the defender class plays exponential strategies, the attacker benefits for different move method scenarios are given by the following. 
The attacker class adopts MM2 and the defender class adopts MM1
Corollary Implications: The implications are similar to that of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate STREAM on the standard IEEE 14 power grid architecture. We first describe our simulation setup, and follow it up with analyzing the simulation results. 
A. Simulation Setup
In this section we primarily: 1) describe an outline of the IEEE 14 bus topology; 2) state our attack setting; and 3) describe the different types of adversary and defender class strategies used in our simulations.
1) Grid Topology: Our system topology is based on the IEEE 14 bus system architecture. A sample example of the architecture is given in Fig. 3 . A graph representation of the architecture is directed and connected in nature, i.e., consists of a set of vertices (buses) and a set of directed edges (connected transmission lines) connecting buses. In this paper, we consider an arbitrarily generated graph of 50 nodes for the purpose of simulation. We assume the presence of a control center that receives from smart meters, data consisting of bus injection and line flow information.
2) Attack Scenario: As a representative example of availability attacks, we model man-in-the-middle hacks in this paper [31] . We consider the case where an adversary class intercepts network data (e.g., breaker and switch states) and meter data from remote terminal units, modifies part of them, and forwards the modified version to the control center to eventually result in resource unavailability due to false decision making. The smart grid defender class is equipped with tests to detect man-in-the-middle attacks. In the case when the attacker and the defender class contains multiple elements, we arbitrarily choose odd n, the number of attack points in the smart grid system, and also prestate (n/2) + 1 attack points.
3) Game Duration, Play Strategies, and Move Costs: Our game duration is fixed to 100 000 time units. In our game setting, we assume the both the defender class and the attacker class has prior knowledge of the strategy type used by each other. STREAM focusses on the following plethora of strategy types played by the defender class and the adversary class, viz., random periodic (RP), exponential (EXP), non-RP (NRP), uniformly random, delayed RP (DRP), delayed exponential (DEXPR), and myopic (M).
The NRP strategy play is the only nonstochastic strategy type in the above mentioned strategy set. We also take the NRP strategy type as a representative of nonstrategic/naive play by players of either class -representing the situation that the class playing NRP just moves in the system based on a precalculated periodic frequency without considering that the opponent might track the exact times when they move. The rationale for the inclusion of delayed strategy types is to reflect the fact that player classes can at times players might "wait" to perform some system checks before executing their timing strategy. Here, delayed periodic and DEXPR imply strategies where there is a "fixed" delay added to the typical RP and exponential timing strategies. For the purpose of this paper, we also propose an M heuristic strategy that is local and focuses only on improving long term defender class benefits by incrementally improving the benefits between two consecutive moves. The provably optimal strategies stated in this paper focus only on the long term benefits of players, without providing significant insights on optimizing short term moves. The M heuristic is applicable in the case when either the defender class is able to observe the last move of the adversary class, or the adversary class is able to observe the last move of the defender class, but not both. Given that a nonobserving player class will play an exponential renewal strategy in this case to outwit its opponent, the goal of the observing player class through the M heuristic is to account for the probability density function of the renewal strategy, and the last move time of opponent, to find the move timing that maximizes its local benefit between two consecutive moves. We are yet to prove the theoretical optimality of the M heuristic, and plan to address it as part of future work. We are also yet to find any heuristic strategies for improving short term player moves when both the player classes go covert, let alone prove their optimality. In this paper we define the STREAM strategy set for the defender class to consist only of the M, DEXPR, EXP, DRP, and RP strategies. These strategies (except M) lie in the set (R ∪ P).
In order to illustrate the efficacy of the STREAM fabric, we assume that the attacker class only plays exponential, DEXPR, or periodic strategies to outwit the defender class (apart from its M strategy). The rationale here follows from the theory in this paper, where we figure out exponential or periodic play by the adversary class being the best against the defender class. Thus, in order to conservatively estimate the availability improvement of STREAM from a defender perspective, we enforce the attacker class to do its best.
In terms of player move costs, we assume that the ratio of the cost a single attacker to a defender to lie between the range [0.5, 2.5]. We take a ratio measure to indirectly represent the budget constraints of both the attacker side and the defender side.
4) Sensor Energy Discharge:
For the purpose of simulation, we assume that the energy discharge in sensors follow the Peukert's law. According to the law, T = (C/I n ), where C is the theoretical capacity in amp-hours, I is the current in amps, T is the time in hours (in the nonsleep mode), and n is the Peukert number. Typically n lies in the range of 1.1-1.3. T denotes how long a sensor battery will really last after full charge. In this paper we choose n = 1.2, and assume that each sensor does not decrease its energy levels in the sleep mode. A sensor goes into the sleep mode when it is not monitoring and detecting security attacks. We also assume that the attack detection module in the sensors takes one unit of time.
B. Simulation Results
In this section, we state and analyze our plot results. For each plot, each point represents the result of the average of running 50 game instances, where each game instance is run for 100 000 time units. For the exponential strategies (both delayed and nondelayed), for each game instance we choose λ uniformly randomly in the range of [.05, 0.2], and a fixed delay to also lie uniformly randomly in the range [5, 20] time units. For the periodic strategies, for each game instance, we fix the period to lie uniformly randomly in the interval [10, 30] . The defender and attacker benefits in the plots are measures of the resource availability of the corresponding players.
1) Single (Attacker-Defender) Scenario: Since we simulate a timing game, we project the defender benefits to be a direct measure of its potential to prevent availability and integrity attacks in the smart grid. From the theory and corresponding simulation results (Fig. 4) , we observe that the defender benefits through STREAM increase in approximately a piecewise linear fashion (a nice approximation to the expressions for defender benefits stated in Theorem 1 in the ratio of ((k 1 )/(k 0 )). This trend holds true for all (attacker strategy, defender strategy) pairs. M and DEXPR strategies by the defender gives it the best average benefit for the optimal class of strategies played by the adversary. This is evident in light of the fact that the defender gets additional information for these strategies, about the adversary's last move. Following from theory, in situations of no information about opponent play, the EXP and DRP strategies work best for the defender. The NRP strategy is clearly nonoptimal due to the possibility of the adversary tracking down the move times of the defender. We observe that compared to nonstrategic moves, using strategic moves the adversary can increase the availability and integrity in the grid by approximately upto 67%. From the energy savings perspective, we observe from Fig. 5 that the defender adopting STREAM strategies can save up to [100%-120%] when using exponential and M class strategies, compared to an NRP strategy. The intuition here is that strategically optimal moves in general are less in number when compared to nonstrategic moves, and thus sensors save more energy.
Practical implications on adversary drop-out:
We infer from our proposed theory and simulations. the adversary under an STREAM setting would drop out of the game once the value of the (k 1 /k 0 ) ratio exceeds a threshold (derived from the above mentioned theorems). From a practical perspective, the latter fact implies that either: 1) the nature of the attack should be such that restoring the network to a stable state requires far lesser effort on behalf of the smart grid than that of the adversary or 2) the defender side should induce the attacker to incur costs high enough to be discouraged to attack the grid. For example, if attacker move costs are represented by the effort required to spoof the communication channel between two buses, at times an attacker is quite likely to spend a lot of effort in executing an attack than a spoof detector that requires to execute just once to restore the channel. In addition, an attacker might need to launch a significant amount of messages to launch a DoS attack using a bus arbitration mechanism, compared to that required by the defender to detect it. This could de-incentivize the adversary from staying in the game.
2) Multiple (Attacker-Defender) Scenario: Figs. 6 and 7, the main observation is that the gain of a malicious adversary class decreases up to approximately 80% in strategic settings (i.e., when defender class uses RP, EXP, DEXPR, and M strategies) when compared to nonstrategic settings, i.e., defender class playing the NRP strategy, for given (k 1 /k 0 ) values. The result obtained is by assuming best play by the adversary class and taking into account the average of the gain from all possible move synchronicity classes, when the number of strategic attack points varies between 2 and 8. Also following from the implications of Theorem 4, we observe through simulations that MM1, i.e., moving independently is generally better than MM2, i.e., moving synchronously at once, for the defender class, as class move rates are additive. This can be explained in view of the fact that the defender class only needs to control at least one attack point, and so it is optimal for the class to move (have control of) one attack point at a time. This behavior from the defender side forces the attacker class to move on all N = (n/2) + 1 attack points as it does not have information about which attack points are in control of the defender class. We also infer that the adversary class should adopt MM2 over MM1 because with increasing N, its benefit decreases at a faster rate using MM1 than using MM2 (assuming that the move rate of both players remain the same. In addition, with the increasing number of defenders, the attacker gain reduces nearly exponentially. Regarding energy savings using strategic moves, we observe from Fig. 8 that the defender class through STREAM can save up to 90% of battery energy compared to making nonstrategic moves, even if the adversary class plays its best moves.
VI. DISCUSSION ON OUR GAME APPROACH In this section, we briefly state some similarities and differences of our game approach when compared to traditionally used models of dynamic games. We also state related work in terms of using dynamic game model types in security problems.
In regard to the type of game theory used by STREAM, models on "repeated games" [32] seem most relevant. However, there are more differences of our game model when compared to repeated games than similarities. The obvious similarity is that like repeated game models, we do need to exercise care in defining appropriate measures of payoff for each player, whether the game be finitely or infinitely repeated in nature. Since we do not use history of past moves by both the defender and adversary classes (assumed to be covert by design), the general use of "discount rates" in repeated game models are not applicable in this paper. In the case, when we model some "player move history" in this paper, the use of such factors would be applicable. As far as important differences are concerned, the game model in STREAM is typically continuous, not discrete. A repeated game has a sequence of stages, and a "stage game" is played again each stage. Thus, time is normally not continuous for a repeated game. As another important difference, the players in the STREAM game model do not know when the other player moves. In a traditional repeated game, each player moves within each stage.
When it comes to the use dynamic games in system security, most works assume games of perfect information, with synchronous play by players [33] - [35] , and some assume games of imperfect information with synchronous play [36] , [37] . In [38] , and several follow-up works related to the same, the authors assume Stackelberg (both Bayesian and non-Bayesian) games of perfect move information and nonsimultaneous play. However, unlike the game model in STREAM, none of the models capture both the concept of imperfect information and nonsimultaneous play.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we addressed the resource management availability problem in the smart grid under an adversarial setting, where in the worst case, an adversary can launch covert attacks. We named our resource availability management framework as STREAM. The STREAM game setting is modeled as an attacker-defender dynamic timing game problem played between potentially multiple attackers and defenders. The intermove periods of the game for both the attacker and the defender class were modeled in the most general case via renewal processes. We studied the dominant STREAM strategies and NE of the dynamic attacker-defender game, and investigated the following parameters at equilibrium and nonequilibrium settings with relevant practical implications: 1) optimal monitoring strategies for the attacker and the defender(s) and 2) optimal utilities for the attacker and the defender(s). As our main results, we showed that: 1) STREAM strategies improve grid availability and integrity by up to 67%, under adversarial settings, compared to existing strategic and nonstrategic methods outside the STREAM strategy set; 2) STREAM reduces average overall energy expenditure via countermeasures by around 90%; 3) increasing the number of defenders in STREAM game setting reduces the effectiveness of the attacker in approximately an exponential fashion, compared to their decrease in a nearly linear fashion for nonstrategic timing scenarios; and 4) the attacker effectiveness in STREAM decreases approximately by upto 80% by strategic STREAM moves made by the defender, compared to the latter making nonstrategic moves.
As the part of future work, we primarily wish to validate the performance of the STREAM under a real-world smart grid.
APPENDIX
In this section, we prove Theorem 4, and the corollaries that follow from it.
Proof of Theorem 4: When both players use strategies from the class R ∪ P, we have for case 1 γ 1 = Pr{CP 1 (t)} = Pr Z For case 3, it directly follows from results in [26] that
Finally, for case 4 we have We have now proved Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 2:
When the defenders play exponential strategies, and the attacker plays a periodic strategy, we have for case 1 We have now proved Corollary 2.
